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TO FEE OR NOT TO FEE: A REVIEW OF A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT
FEES
By James C. Nicholas, Arthur C. Nelson, and Julian C.
Juergensmeyer. American Planning Association: Planners Press.
1991. Pp. 294. $54.95.
ROBERT M. RHODES*
A growing number of communities across the nation now look to11X the private sector for financial help to pay for new service and
infrastructure needs. Development impact fees1 are one way to help
raise money for these facilities and services. Impact fees shift some of
the burden of accommodating growth away from taxpayers and exist-
ing development to new development. 2 Of course, this trend reflects a
complementary public mood to require new development to shoulder
a larger part of its service and facility needs, popularly known as "pay
as you grow."
This practical volume will accomplish the authors' aim of helping
local governments use standard procedures to fairly impose develop-
ment impact fees based on the judicially recognized dual rational
nexus standard.3 It is a why to do it, how to do it, and what not to do
guidebook for localities interested in developing such impact fees,
drawing together the economics, politics, administration, and legal as-
pects of these fees.
Development impact fees are scheduled charges applied to new de-
velopment to generate revenue for the construction or expansion of
capital facilities that are located beyond the boundaries of new devel-
opment and that benefit the contributing development. 4 They are a
* Partner, Steel Hector & Davis, Tallahassee office. A.B., 1964, University of California;
J.D., 1968, University of California at Berkeley; M.P.A., 1973, Harvard University. The author
also served as chair of the State of Florida Second Environmental Land Management Study
Committee, 1982-1984.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 4, 5.
2. JAmEs C. NICHOLAS ET AL., A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO DE ELoPMENT IMPACT FanS XX
(1991) [hereinafter PRAcTrnoNEm's GunDE].
3. St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991).
4. See, e.g., Key West, Fla. Ordinance 84-50 (impact fees imposed on new development to
pay proportional shares of costs for new sewage treatment plant and solid waste disposal inciner-
ator) (discussed in PRAcarmrroNER's GumE, supra note 2, at 145-49).
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species of development exaction,5 a process where government grants
development approval conditioned upon, among other factors, pay-
ments by developers to defray the costs of land, facilities, and equip-
ment in connection with providing new or expanded public facilities. 6
The authors' main thesis is that the dual rational nexus impact fee is
the emerging mainstream approach to calculating impact fees.7 Impact
fees not based on a rational nexus are determined to be either imprac-
tical or held to be invalid by the courts. 8 The principal legal advantage
of the rational nexus impact fee is its similarity to a user fee9 and the
consequent necessary connection or nexus among the needs generated
by the fee payer, the fee payments, and the fee benefits received. To
their credit, the authors recognize that even a standardized system of
rational nexus impact fees will not pay the total cost for all needed
facilities, or even a major share, and that the preponderance of the
costs of these facilities still must be paid by taxes or other revenues.' 0
The book is conveniently divided into four sections. The first sec-
tion reviews the policy and politics of impact fees and places these fees
within a planning context." By noting early concepts of exactions,
such as mandatory dedications, 2 the authors observe in this section
that impact fees are a logical extension of expanding efforts to force
new development to pay its fair share of new development costs. This
section continues with a discussion of the political rationale for im-
pact fees, political considerations, and a review of kinds of communi-
ties most likely to adopt impact fee programs. The overarching theme
here is that impact fees are a form of land use regulation-not a tax-
linked to comprehensive plans. As such, fees depend on these local
plans, particularly the capital improvement program of such plans,
5. "Development exactions" can be defined as:
the process by which developments are required to, as a condition of development
approval:
1. Dedicate sites for public or common facilities.
2. Construct and dedicate public or common facilities.
3. Purchase and donate vehicles and equipment for public or common use.
4. Make payments to defray the costs of land, facilities, vehicles, and equipment
in connection with public or common facilities.
DEvELoPMENT EXACTIONs 3 (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes, eds., 1987).
6. Id.




11. Id. at 1-70.
12. Mandatory dedications require developers to dedicate parcels of land for public use. See
D v o mNT ExACTioNs, supra note 5, at 17-18.
IMPACTFEES
for legal validity. In this context, impact fees are viewed as regulations
that help finance and implement capital improvement programs.
The second section reviews the process of developing impact fee
policy and methodology. 13 It contains many suggestions and recom-
mendations for determining the need for impact fees and how to de-
sign a program. The discussion includes views from the development
community regarding fees and encourages localities to involve af-
fected citizens and interests in the policy development process. A thor-
ough discussion of how to determine proportionate share is included,
covering the following topics: steps communities should follow to as-
cribe facility costs to new development, how to credit new develop-
ment for its past and future expected fiscal contribution to facilities,
how to determine appropriate recoupment policies for fees applied to
help fund existing facilities, and how to ensure that fees properly ben-
efit payers.
Section three presents numerous examples of impact fee calcula-
tions. The section discusses simple fees (advance payment and subse-
quent recoupment as development occurs) and more complicated fees
used to help finance ongoing capital improvement programs and in-
volving sophisticated credit and recoupment policy issues. 14 The sec-
tion also addresses a new kind of impact fee, the linkage fee. 5
Particularly noted is the linkage fee employed by the City of San
Francisco for low- and moderate-income housing. Other linkage fee
examples from across the nation are also analyzed.
The fourth section includes model statutes, ordinances, and admin-
istrative procedures to implement impact fee programs.' 6 These are the
legal instruments that make the assessment, collection, and dispersal
of impact fees possible. Although the authors include model statutory
language authorizing and providing state guidelines for impact fees,
they suggest that communities in most states usually do not need ex-
plicit statutory authority to assess impact fees as long as such fees are
a justified exercise of a local government police power.' 7 The section
and the book conclude with various tips, tricks, traps, and conse-
quences of impact fee calculations.
13. PcArrToER's GUIDE, supra note 2, at 71-118.
14. Id. at 119-69.
15. Linkage fees are assessments on nonresidential development that are spent on social
services such as low-income housing, day care, or public art. Id. at 2. They are materially differ-
ent, therefore, from impact fees, which are used for infrastructure costs.
16. Id. at 169-278.
17. Id. at 169.
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As previously noted, the authors strongly encourage localities to
buttress the legal validity of impact fees by solidly embedding fee as-
sessment in local comprehensive plan capital facility elements. 8 They
observe that "it is easier to convince a judge of the reasonableness of
an impact fee program if it is based upon and even required by spe-
cific comprehensive plan language."' 9 They also note that it is "easier
to satisfy the nexus requirements of the Nollan decision 2° if the pur-
poses and implementation details of the impact fee program are set
forth in the planning documents for the jurisdiction."'' 2 These com-
ments are particularly relevant in states such as Florida that require
land development regulations to be consistent with comprehensive
plans. 22
Nonetheless, even plan-based and directed regulatory impact fees
must meet both prongs of the dual rational nexus test. The authors
explain the two prongs of the rational nexus test as follows:
1. Impact fees must be calculated by measuring the needs created for
public infrastructure by the new development charged the impact
fees. Such charges cannot exceed the cost of such infrastructure to
the relevant unit of local government.
2. Impact fees must be earmarked and spent for the purposes for
which they are collected so as to benefit those who pay them.2
The Florida Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this test in the case
of St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Association.24 In
that case, the court confirmed the ability of localities to impose a
school impact fee tailored to certain prescribed standards but stayed
enforcement of St. Johns County's school impact fee until the second
prong of the dual rational nexus test had been met.25 Of significance is
the court's insistence that both prongs of the dual rational nexus test
be met and the scrutiny and analysis of these criteria by the court.26
18. See generally id. at 37-38.
19. Id. at 37.
20. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (land use regulation held
unlawful where it did not further the same governmental purpose it was designed to regulate).
See also PRACnormR'S GuaE, supra note 2, at 35 (quoting Robert M. Rhodes, The Impact of
Nollan on Florida Law: Has the Tide Turned? 3 GRowTm MGrr. STUD. NEWSL. (Center for
Governmental Resp., U. of Fla. C. of L.), Jan. 1988, at 1, 2: "Nollan establishes a federal
exaction test that requires a substantial, rationally linked, and, arguably, direct nexus between
permit burden and conditions. An indirect nexus, even if reasonably related, will not pass federal
constitutional muster.").
21. PRACTMONER'S GuimE, supra note 2, at 37.
22. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202(1) (1989).
23. PtcrAroNma's GumE, supra note 2, at 33.
24. 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991).
25. Id. at 642.
26. Id. at 637-39.
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At the outset, the court recognized that a school impact fee differs
from a water and sewer or road fee.2 This difference exists because
many of the new residents bearing the burden of the school fee do not
have children who will benefit from the new schools. The county's
consultant, Dr. James C. Nicholas, one of the authors of the present
volume, determined that on average there were 0.44 public school
children per single family home in St. Johns County. 21 Based on this
determination, the builders argued that the impact fee failed the first
prong of the dual rational nexus test because many of the new resi-
dents would not impact the public school system and thus, the fee
payment was not reasonably connected to actual needs generated by a
large majority of the payers.29 The court rejected this contention as
"too simplistic. ' 30
The same argument could be made with respect to many other
facilities that governmental entities are expected to provide. Not all
of the new residents will use the parks or call for fire protection, yet
the county will have to provide additional facilities so as to be in a
position to serve each dwelling unit .... It may be that some of the
units will never house children.... The St. Johns County impact fee
is designed to provide the capacity to serve the educational needs of
all one hundred dwelling units. We conclude that the ordinance
meets the first prong of the rational nexus test.31
Thus, the court determined that a potential future need for facilities
based on reasonable growth and new facility projections was suffi-
cient to establish a valid connection between the need for the project
and the cost of the service, thereby satisfying the first prong of the
dual rational nexus test.
The question of whether the St. Johns' ordinance met the require-
ments of the second prong of the dual rational nexus test was "more
troublesome. ' 3 2 The court reiterated that not every new unit of devel-
opment had to benefit from the impact fee by having a child who
could attend public school residing in that unit. 33
It is enough that new public schools are available to serve that unit
of development. Thus, if this were a countywide impact fee designed




31. Id. at 638-39.
32. Id. at 639.
33. Id.
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to fund construction of new schools as needed throughout the
county, we could easily conclude that the second prong of the test
had been met.34
However, the St. Johns County impact fee did not apply county-
wide." It was not effective within the boundaries of a municipality
unless the municipality entered into an interlocal agreement with the
county to collect the fee.3 6 Notwithstanding this limitation, the ordi-
nance allowed impact fee funds to be spent anywhere in the county,
and there was no prohibition against spending funds to build schools
within a municipality that did not enter into an interlocal agreement.37
Therefore, the court determined the fee failed the second prong of the
rational nexus test because there was no restriction on the use of the
funds to ensure that they would be spent to benefit fee payers. 38 Con-
sequently, the court held that "no impact fee may be collected under
the ordinance until such time as substantially all of the population of
St. Johns County is subject to the ordinance. '39
The court's concern that the fee meet both prongs of the rational
nexus test and its thorough review of the county's efforts to do so
portends greater judicial willingness to more closely scrutinize govern-
ment action imposing and applying impact fees. General local govern-
ment findings of public interest and even a credible plan-based
determination of need will not alone save an impact fee that cannot
meet the dual rational nexus test. This is particularly relevant as Flor-
ida localities expand the use of fees4° and consider San Francisco's
experience with affordable housing linkage fees.41 If, as the authors
suggest, linkage fees promote a social good not necessarily connected
to service and facility needs generated by a fee payer's project, 42 these







40. A 1991 survey found 133 local units of government imposing at least 414 "different
active impact fees." ADVISORY CoTmcm ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1991 FLORmA
ACIR IMPACT Fun SuRuW: 6 (September 1991) [hereinafter ACIR REPORT]. The 414 figure does
not mean 414 different types of impact fees; it means 414 total, that is, where 10 counties each
have a park impact fee, the survey counted 10 different fees. See id. at 5, 6. Furthermore, the
survey also found increasingly exotic uses for impact fee revenues, including bike paths, librar-
ies, and cultural facilities. Id. at 6.
41. PRACTITIONER'S GuME, supra note 2, at 164-68.
42. Id. at 164.
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Although the authors offer a model for state legislation authorizing
and setting guidelines for impact fees, they suggest that "some states,
such as Florida, might be better off without impact fee enabling legis-
lation since the courts have essentially hammered out a process that
many legal scholars find adequate. '43
I disagree. Florida needs statewide guidelines for local development
impact fees. By suggesting that Florida rely only on case law for guid-
ance, the authors place too much faith in a handful of court decisions
and confer on the courts too much policy discretion. Florida appellate
case law comprises only six cases since 1975, 44 five of which were de-
cided before enactment of Florida's growth management legislation in
1985.41 Impact fees are too important to be left-like an orphaned
child-on the steps of the courthouse for care. Now that impact fees
have general judicial support in Florida, numerous second-generation
impact fee issues should be settled in state legislation. 46 It makes little
sense to litigate these issues case by case; instead, sound and efficient
public policy demands that these statewide policy issues be specifically
resolved and articulated by law.
Legislation need not undercut or modify existing case law, which
established local authority for the fees and created the dual rational
nexus test. Indeed, legislation can expressly state that it is not in-
tended to abrogate case law. Thus, local governments would lose no
authority because of legislation.
Legislation can recognize what practice has made obvious: impact
fees play an important role in paying for growth management. 47 The
next step is to protect the funding source while enhancing growth
43. Id. at 169.
44. St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (uphold-
ing school impact fees where applied countywide); Contractors and Builders Ass'n v. City of
Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976) (upholding impact fees to pay for water and sewer facili-
ties); Home Builders and Contractors' Ass'n v. Board of County Commissioners, 446 So. 2d 140
(Fla. 4th DCA 1983), review denied, 451 So. 2d 848 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 976 (1984)
(upholding road impact fees); Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th
DCA), review denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983) (upholding impact fees for parks); City of
Miami Beach v. Jacobs, 341 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 945 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977) (ordinance assessing monthly charge to property owners hook-
ing up to certain fire lines held unconstitutional for lack of earmarking of funds); Broward
County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (impact fee held a tax because
ordinance failed to specify how collected fees would be spent).
45. Ch. 85-55, 1985 Fla. Laws 207.
46. Impact fee legislation was proposed in Florida in 1991, but it did not pass. See FLA.
LEois., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1991 REotnuA SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILS at 137, SB
1522; id., HISTORY OF HousE BILLS at 338, HB 2261.
The authors cite to eight states with general impact fee legislation: Arizona, California, Geor-
gia, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont. PRAcTmoNER's GuinE, supra note 2, at 38-
39.
47. Local governments in Florida use impact fees as a source of more than a quarter of a
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management requirements by integrating impact fees into local plan-
ning and plan implementation. Both goals can be achieved by impact
fee legislation, which can ensure that impact fees are plan-based and
are used to fund capital facilities and services identified in local plans.
These legislative provisions would add certainty to the growth man-
agement process. They would help local governments and developers
plan and budget while easing legitimate concerns of lenders created by
uncertain regulations and governmental processes that impede or re-
strict development. Also, legislation that ties impact fees to compre-
hensive plans may provide a catalyst to break the development logjam
in some localities caused partly by concurrency requirements. 48
Legislation also can clarify areas in the law that the Florida cases
have not addressed and that are murky. For example, it can clarify
that localities may provide exemptions from fees to achieve other im-
portant goals of local comprehensive plans, such as providing afford-
able housing. It can confirm localities' ability to vary impact fee rates
by service area, a decision that would be left to local government dis-
cretion. Legislation can expressly authorize localities to recoup the
costs of services provided to new projects through existing facilities,
much like Maine's impact fee law.49 It can allow for credits to devel-
opers for exactions or contributions made in connection with prior
development but benefitting similar facilities. Furthermore, legislation
can clarify the authority of local units of government to enter into
intergovernmental agreements to jointly pay for facilities and services
through impact fees, a coordination of growth planning that is cur-
rently woefully inadequate.
Legislative guidelines can also provide for the creation of reasona-
bly sized service areas or "benefit zones" designated to receive the
specific benefit promised by the collected fees. The designation of
these areas could be crucial to surviving the second prong of the dual
rational nexus test: that fees exacted from development requiring new
or improved services and facilities be used in turn to offset the costs
of those services and facilities.
Finally, legislation could authorize payment of impact fees in in-
stallments. This provision would provide greater security to bond
houses by ensuring a steady stream of impact fee revenue, thereby en-
hancing the bonding of fees, and would facilitate development by re-
billion dollars of revenue and projects in lieu of general revenue. ACIR REPORT, supra note 40,
at 15.
48. Douglas P. Buck and Richard E. Gentry, The Case for Impact Fee Legislation, QuA-
rry Crrm, Sept. 1991, at 26.
49. ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4354 (Supp. 1990).
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moving the requirement that the developer pay the full impact fee up
front.
Authors Nicholas, Nelson, and Juergensmeyer have produced a use-
ful and usable impact fee cookbook. It complements well the related
American Planning Association publications, Development
Exactione° and Development Impact Fees5 and is recommended to
the impact fee practitioner and policymaker.
50. DEvEoPumEN EXACTioNS, supra note 5.
51. DEVEOPMENT IMPACT FEEs (Arthur C. Nelson, ed., 1988).

